Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice
Volume 2021

Number 2

Article 3

February 2022

A Taxonomy of Cyberattacks against Critical Infrastructure
Miloslava Plachkinova
Kennesaw State University, mplachki@kennesaw.edu

Ace Vo
Loyola Marymount University, ace.vo@lmu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp
Part of the Information Security Commons, Management Information Systems Commons, and the
Technology and Innovation Commons

Recommended Citation
Plachkinova, Miloslava and Vo, Ace (2022) "A Taxonomy of Cyberattacks against Critical Infrastructure,"
Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice: Vol. 2021 : No. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2021/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.

A Taxonomy of Cyberattacks against Critical Infrastructure
Abstract
The current study proposes a taxonomy to organize existing knowledge on cybercrimes against critical
infrastructure such as power plants, water treatment facilities, dams, and nuclear facilities. Routine
Activity Theory is used to inform a three-dimensional taxonomy with the following dimensions: hacker
motivation (likely offender), cyber, physical, and cyber-physical components of any cyber-physical system
(suitable target), and security (capable guardian). The focus of the study is to develop and evaluate the
classification tool using Design Science Research (DSR) methodology. Publicly available data was used to
evaluate the utility and usability of the proposed artifact by exploring three possible scenarios – Stuxnet,
the Ukrainian power grid shut down, and ransomware attacks. While similar taxonomies exist, none of
them have been verified due to the sensitive nature of the data and this would be one of the first
empirically validated frameworks to explore cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. By better
understanding these attacks, we can be better prepared to prevent and respond to incidents.
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INTRODUCTION
Cybercrime is a problem of growing significance in society. This is partially due to
the mass integration of technology not just in our everyday lives, but also in critical
government infrastructure. The overreliance of technology has created a new
opportunity for hackers and other individuals with malicious intentions to take
advantage and compromise systems and breach databases with sensitive
information that may pertain to national security, individuals’ medical, financial,
educational, personal, etc. records. When it comes to critical infrastructure such as
power plants, nuclear facilities, electric grid, dams, they are especially vulnerable
to attacks because they were built predominantly before today’s cybersecurity
standards. These growing opportunities combined with the increased motivation
and resources that hackers have, make our society an easy target of cybercrimes.
Specifically, cyberterrorism and information warfare demonstrate in practice the
massive impact of malicious attacks. While such attacks may not be as frequent as
other types of cybercrimes like cyberstalking, cyberbullying, identity theft or data
breaches, they have the capability to potentially take down entire countries’
infrastructures and paralyze critical resources. Such attacks are often state-funded
and categorized as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). Thus, it is vital to focus on
this growing threat to national security and consider new approaches to better
protect individuals and government structures and identify means to respond to
incidents.
A significant first step in this direction would be to analyze the hacker culture
and understand why these individuals commit cybercrimes in the first place.
Attacking the root cause of the problem is the only viable solution to reduce
cybercrimes in the future. While some hackers may be motivated by financial gain,
others commit crimes for social or political reasons. By focusing on these different
types of offenders, we can propose more adequate solutions to policy makers
because one single policy may not be able to adequately resolve all these problems.

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
When it comes to cybercrimes, a significant issue is the lack of policies to
effectively deter the offenders. This is partially due to the fact that cybercrimes
often cross state and national borders and this creates a significant challenge when
it comes to identifying and prosecuting the hackers. Furthermore, some countries
such as China, Russia, or Ukraine for instance, do not have extradition treaties with
the US, which makes it very difficult to prosecute any hackers residing in those
countries.
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Identifying the hackers who commit cybercrimes is equally challenging. The
growing use of technology and the easier access to exploits on the Darknet make it
easier even for someone with limited technical skills to commit crimes. And while
technology is rapidly developing, our legislature on cybercrimes and
cyberterrorism is lagging behind. Part of this is due to the complexity of the topic
and the lack of understanding among policy makers. In addition, many still do not
believe that entire critical infrastructures can be compromised with little effort.
However, just because it has not happened in large scale, it does not mean that such
attacks are impossible or unfeasible. The lack of adequate incident response
guidelines is another important aspect of this problem.
The challenges of cybercrime and cyberterrorism also come from the fact that
we are yet to see a massive attack in the US. However, critical infrastructure in Iran
and Ukraine has already been attacked. In 2011, Iran’s nuclear program was
compromised with the Stuxnet virus and in 2015 Ukraine’s power grid experienced
a cyberattack. These examples demonstrate the global impact such crimes can have.
This is often due to the fact that critical infrastructure has been developed a while
ago when technology was not so sophisticated. So, when such legacy information
systems, also known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), are
now connected to the Internet, this creates a myriad of threats. For instance, the
legacy systems are no longer maintained and often lack sufficient antivirus
protection. These flaws make them easy targets of hackers who are often statefunded and have the resources, time, and opportunities to take down critical systems
of national security.
The lack of a unified approach to protect critical infrastructure is another
significant problem. There are so many different types of attacks and global
organizations and governments fail to even agree on the definitions of “cybercrime”
and “cyberterrorism”. Most criminological theories predominantly focus on
physical crime and not much attention has been paid to explaining and reducing
cybercrimes, especially those focused at attacking critical infrastructure and
SCADA systems.
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BACKGROUND LITERATURE
Cybercrime
Like traditional crime, cybercrime has many different facets and occurs in various
environments and scenarios. When it comes to defining the term “cybercrime”,
there have been multiple attempts and the definition itself evolves over time due to
the changes in technology, its growing implementation in society, and the impact
of using various tools and devices in our lives. For example, The Council of
Europe’s Cybercrime Treaty uses the term “Cybercrime” to refer to offences
ranging from criminal activity against data to content and copyright infringement
(Krone, 2005). However, Zeviar-Geese (1997) suggests that the definition is
broader, including activities such as fraud, unauthorized access, child pornography,
and cyberstalking. The United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of
Computer Related Crime (United Nations, 1995) includes fraud, forgery, and
unauthorized access in its cybercrime definition. Gordon and Ford (2006) define
cybercrime as: “any crime that is facilitated or committed using a computer,
network, or hardware device” (p. 14).
The National Research Council (2009) described cyberattacks as “deliberate
computer-to-computer attacks that disrupt, disable, destroy, or take over a computer
system, or damage or steal the information it contains” (p. 1). The umbrella term
“cyberattack” can include any of the following: infecting computers and networks
with viruses and worms that control, slow down or damage computers, exploiting
spyware to probe for vulnerabilities or steal data, and conducting denial of service
attacks, with or without the assistance of botnets, to overwhelm websites and
networks by flooding them with junk communications. Cyberattacks exclude
physical assaults on computers using other weapons, such as destroying computers
with hammers or explosives (Kenney, 2015). According to the National Research
Council (2009), cyberattacks are computer attacks on other computers carried out
in cyberspace, including the Internet, telecommunications infrastructures, and
computer systems. The immediate objective of a cyberattack may be to harm the
computer targeted, steal information from it, or simply observe the system to
exploit vulnerabilities for a subsequent attack. The key is that the attacker conducts
the intrusion with hostile, if not necessarily destructive, intent – without the
knowledge or consent of the victim.
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However, the problem with all these definitions is that they are very broad and
do not contain many discriminating properties to classify them more specifically.
This lack of differentiation may also lead to disparities in the potential sentencing
procedures when it comes to prosecuting hackers. Furthermore, the perpetrators of
cyberattacks can be states or non-state actors, the damage caused by the attack can
be extensive or minuscule, and the attack’s purpose may be to achieve almost any
economic, political, social, or psychological objective (Kenney, 2015).

Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism, or cyberwarfare, is much less frequent compared to cybercrimes
and cyberattacks. These are typically carried out by entire states who launch
repeated computer attacks against their adversaries to deny them the ability to use
cyberspace effectively, while safeguarding their own ability to do the same. Such
attacks are known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). The term “APT” emerged
in the last 10 years and it has been associated with a new type of insidious threats
that use multiple attack techniques and vectors, and that are conducted by stealth to
avoid detection so that hackers can retain control over target systems unnoticed for
long periods of time (Tankard, 2011).
Cyberwarfare refers to offensive computer assaults that seek to damage or
destroy adversaries’ networks and infrastructures or deter them from waging
cyberattacks of their own. Like conventional warfare, cyberwarfare is instrumental:
belligerents seek to impose their will on their enemies by attacking them in pursuit
of some political goal or objective (Clausewitz, 1976). Unlike traditional warfare,
cyberwarfare occurs exclusively in cyberspace. The physical acts of destroying
virtual networks by bombing computer servers or telecommunications cables are
now taking place in the cyberspace.
Cyberwarfare is largely, but not exclusively, the domain of states. States, and
private hackers that act on their behalf, view cyberwarfare as a tool through which
they can advance their national interests. This virtual continuation of policy by
other means is still less violent than traditional warfare, leading some observers to
declare that cyberwarfare is not “real.” In one version of this argument, cyberwar
is not real war because cyberweapons lack their “own force or energy” (Rid, 2013,
p. 81).
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Because information about cyberterrorism and cyberterrorists is generally
considered classified and cannot be released to the public, the public can usually
only infer that cyberterrorism and cyberterrorists exist. However, in 2010 Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) chief, Robert Mueller, told an RSA Conference of
computer security professionals, ‘‘The cyber-terrorism threat is real and rapidly
expanding’’. He indicated that terrorists have shown a clear interest in hacking
skills and combining real attacks with cyberattacks (Hua & Bapna, 2013).
APT is a critical component of cyberterrorist attacks. Tankard (2011) defines the
term as “a new breed of insidious threats that use multiple attack techniques and
vectors and that are conducted by stealth to avoid detection so that hackers can
retain control over target systems unnoticed for long periods of time” (p. 16).
Furthermore, he explains that traditional defenses aimed at keeping known threats
out of the network are no longer sufficient against the exploits being used to
conduct such attacks. Tankard (2011) insists that the focus should be on
“developing a defense in depth strategy that aims to constantly monitor networks
and security controls for their effectiveness” (p. 16). These advanced persistent
threats are the main weapon of cyberterrorists and in order to launch such an attack,
one must be supported by the infrastructure of an entire country. Since there are not
that many powerful countries in the world in terms of their cyber capabilities, it
could be easy to identify the offenders based on the current socio-political context
in the world because often these crimes are triggered by certain political and
economic events. However, proving beyond reasonable doubt in front of an
international court that a particular country committed the crime is essentially
impossible.

Hacker Motivation
Generally, cyberterrorists are considered a subgroup of hackers (Beveren, 2001;
Rogers, 1999). What differentiates them from hackers is their motivation.
Typically, cyberterrorists are politically or religiously motivated and similar to the
examples we have seen in the physical world – their goal is to create fear and panic
among civilians and disrupt or destroy public and private infrastructure (Hua &
Bapna, 2013).
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Sometimes cyberterrorists may also try to coerce a targeted government to
negotiate with them, or show their existence to their community, or demonstrate
their capabilities to their political and financial supporters (Embar-Seddon, 2002;
Verton & Brownlow, 2003). Furthermore, as Poremba (2011) points out, “Unlike
viruses or computer attacks that result in a denial of service a cyberterrorist attack
is designed to cause physical violence or extreme financial harm”. In contrast,
common hackers’ motivations include addiction to hacking, curiosity, intention to
gain power, peer recognition and the sense of belonging to a group (Beveren, 2001).
Increasingly, the motivation is to make money (Aaronson, 2005) and some cases
from the U.S. Department of Justice are showing that most hackers tried to make
money from their hacking (Hua & Bapna, 2013). Generally, a skilled hacker may
attack the same target as a cyberterrorist; however, the cyberterrorist would
typically have more resources than the hacker to support long-term uninterrupted
attacks or APTs (Furnell & Warren, 1999; Quigley, 2007). This evidence only
comes to show the growing impact of cyberterrorism on our society and the
pressing need to develop new policies that would provide international law
enforcement agencies with the necessary legal frameworks to investigate and
prosecute cybercrimes and cyberterrorism.
When it comes to the motivation of any cybercriminals, there are three basic
aspects. They could be inspired by the political, socio-cultural, or economical
contexts. Gandhi et al. (2011) describe this phenomenon as a Venn diagram, and
they provide examples of each type of hacker motivation.
Cyber criminals involved in politically motivated attacks can be members of
extremist groups who use cyberspace to spread propaganda, attack websites and
networks of their political enemies, steal money to fund their activities, or plan and
coordinate physical-world crime (Cross & Shinder, 2008). Based on the nature of
an attack, politically motivated attacks can be further subdivided as: protests against
political actions, protests against laws or public documents, and outrage against acts
related to physical violence (Gandhi et al., 2011).
Economic situations and personal or corporate financial greed often provide
motives for cyberattacks. Cyber mercenaries and organized cartels also operate in
cyberspace. Other examples of economically motivated attacks include espionage,
ransomware, identity theft, piracy, electronic fraud and tax evasion, money
laundering, etc. With the growing use of technology, now a new term has emerged,
Crime as a Service, and it has already been ranked in the top IT security threats for
2018. Crime-as-a-Service is when a professional criminal or group of criminals
develop advanced tools, which are offered up for sale or rent to other criminals or
criminal-wannabes who are usually less experienced. Typically, the exchange
would occur on the Darknet and it will be through some type of cryptocurrency
such as Bitcoin because it is anonymous and essentially untraceable.
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Socio-cultural conflict can be viewed as competition between individuals or
groups over incompatible goals, scarce resources, or power, including the denial of
control to others (Avruch, 2009). Cross-cultural conflict can also manifest as ethnic
conflict. Cyber conflicts incited for cultural reasons include conflicts between
Taiwan-China (August 1999), Russia-Estonia (2007) and Russia-Georgia (2008).
Similarly, the Israel-Palestine cyberconflict, where national symbols – the Israeli
flag, Hebrew text, and a recording of the Israeli national anthem – were put into
Hezbollah home page (Karatzogianni, 2008), belongs in this category. Gandhi et
al. (2011) point out the sometimes the hackers’ motivation can also be ethical and
that many cyberattacks are motivated by deeply rooted socio-cultural issues.

ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY
While cybercrime and cyberterrorism have become problems of growing
importance to our society, little work has been done to address the problem from a
theoretical perspective and propose an approach grounded in theory. Overall, very
few criminological theories have been applied to crimes in cyberspace. Prior work
has been focused on explaining contributing factors to malware victimization
(Lévesque et al., 2017), the differences and similarities between physical and
cybercrimes (Llinares, 2015), as well as understanding privacy attitudes and safety
behaviors online. While these studies add knowledge to this growing field of
concern, they are predominantly concerned with attacks against individuals and do
not explicitly address critical infrastructure. Cyberterrorism is an inherently
difficult to explore due to the sensitive nature of the data and the limited
opportunities to collect and analyze it. In addition, the gap in research can be
explained by the fact that cyberterrorism is a relatively new concept and there is
generally a lack of theoretical frameworks to explain it.
The current study utilizes Routine Activity Theory (RAT) to explain
cyberattacks against critical infrastructures and SCADA systems. Others have
already used this theory when looking into cybercrimes. For instance, Choo (2011)
focused on RAT to mitigate risks and opportunities for cybercrimes to occur
through making cybercrime more difficult to commit and by increasing the risks of
detection and punishment associated with committing cybercrimes. This paper
provides an overview of different types of cybercrimes and proposes mechanisms
to prevent them. However, the authors do not go into much depth on the issue of
cyberterrorism and how RAT can be used to prevent it.
Clarke and Felson (1993) proposed that a crime occurs when there is a likely
offender, a suitable target, and a capable guardian is absent (Figure 1). Routine
Activity Theory (RAT) has been developed originally to explain physical crime,
but it can be also applied to cyberspace.
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Figure 1. Routine Activity Theory
In a cyberterrorism context, the likely offender would be any of the nation-states
such as China, Russia or North Korea who have the capability to launch APT
attacks. A suitable target would be any critical infrastructure like a power grid, a
dam, a nuclear facility, etc. Those are any type of facilities of importance to national
security that require additional security and have extra layers of protection due to
their impact on society. And finally, the absence of a capable guardian would be
considered the outdated legacy systems and cleartext protocols used for SCADA
systems to communicate between the different components.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There is a pressing need to address the problem of cybercrime and cyberterrorism.
The first step is to focus on the root cause of the problem by developing a taxonomy
that can classify existing knowledge on the various types of attacks against critical
infrastructure and the motivation of the hackers who launch them. Furthermore,
utilizing Routine Activity Theory would be instrumental in taking a rigorous
scholarly approach to the topic. This is a novel way of approaching the problem
and can assist in the development of more adequate and relevant policies to prevent
such attacks in the future. The current study aims to address the following research
questions:

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2021/iss2/3
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RQ1: Can we classify knowledge on cyberattacks against critical
infrastructure?
RQ2: Can we utilize Routine Activity Theory to mitigate cyberattacks against
critical infrastructure?
The current study is the first attempt not only to create but empirically validate
a taxonomy of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. Thus, we are taking a
qualitative study approach and relying on grounded theory to identify themes and
to evaluate the proposed classification of knowledge in the field. The goal is to
assist practitioners and scholars in improving the guardianship of such facilities of
national security and improve the existing incident detection and response
practices. This is a crucial step to strengthen the overall security posture of our
country.

TAXONOMY DEVELOPMENT
Prior studies have attempted to classify knowledge on cyberattacks against critical
infrastructure. Alcaraz and Zeadally (2015) provided a detailed list of security
controls derived from a number of US and international standards and best
practices. However, the focus of the project was to highlight which controls are
most referenced across the standards and derive an inventory of those top controls
to prevent cyberattacks against SCADA systems. Another study proposed by Papp
et al. (2015) used the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database to
identify five types of cyberattacks: (1) precondition, (2) vulnerability, (3) target, (4)
attack method, and (5) effect of the attack. However, these classifications are
general and not relevant directly to SCADA systems and critical infrastructure. And
finally, (Humayoun, 2011) conceptualize cyber-physical systems (CPS) from a
security perspective. They propose a three-dimensional taxonomy that explains
cybercrimes based on CPS systems, CPS components, and a security dimension.
While others have investigated this issue in the past, the proposed classifications
have not been empirically tested due to the sensitive nature of the context.
The current study addresses these gaps and offers a comprehensive classification
of cyberterrorism attacks with consideration of the hackers’ motivation. With
regards to policy recommendations, our focus is on the guardianship aspect of RAT
and how the government can better protect the legacy SCADA systems and
improve the security posture of these facilities.

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2021

9

Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice, Vol. 2021, No. 2 [2021], Art. 3

The first dimension, hacker motivation, is related to the offenders which could
be politically, socio-culturally, and/or economically motivated. The second
dimension represents the cyber, physical, and cyber-physical components of any
cyber-physical system (CPS) and is a differentiation of the various aspects of the
suitable target. The third dimension, security, is related to the threats,
vulnerabilities, and controls that represent the lack of the capable guardian. These
different dimensions are conceptualized and depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Proposed Taxonomy

METHODOLOGY
The current study utilizes Design Science Research (DSR) methods. This approach
is appropriate because it addresses real-world problems of cyberattacks against
critical infrastructure through an academic lens and provides a solution that is
grounded in research (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; Hevner et al., 2004). More
specifically, DSR has three cycles, and they are addressed as follows:

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2021/iss2/3
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•
•
•

Rigor cycle – an extensive literature review was completed to inform the
initial design of the taxonomy.
Relevance cycle – requirements were derived from the gap in knowledge,
skills, and technology that currently exists in the critical infrastructure
facilities and the information security professionals who maintain them.
Design cycle – the taxonomy was initially created based on analyzing
academic work, but it was validated and refined through simulations and
then we will conduct qualitative interviews with practitioners in the field
who are the target of the proposed tool.

To evaluate the taxonomy, we used three scenarios that are based on real-world
cyberattacks. These scenarios are informed from publicly available data on prior
attacks such as Stuxnet, the Ukrainian power grid shut down, and numerous
ransomware attacks against public institutions in the US. The purpose of initially
testing the taxonomy with simulations is to evaluate it and document the lessons
learned or suggestions for improvement before taking the next step and evaluating
it through interviews with practitioners in the field. The themes that emerge from
testing the taxonomy with the scenarios can be used to inform the development of
empirical generalizations and, in turn, theory to explain cyberattacks against critical
infrastructure facilities. The results can help refine the proposed taxonomy and
evaluate its utility and usability for practitioners in the field who encounter various
cyberattacks and do not have adequate mechanisms to provide effective and
efficient guardianship.
The sensitive nature of this project presents a significant challenge to identifying
participants and collecting the data. Thus, we created simulations based on publicly
available data on cyberterrorist attacks. While the current study predominantly
explores the problem from a US-centered perspective, cybercrimes and
cyberterrorism are global issues and our methodological approach can be replicated
in other countries.
To operationalize the proposed taxonomy, the first step is to explore and explain
scenarios that are based on real-world cyberattacks against critical infrastructure
facilities. That way can avoid any issues with obtaining access to sensitive topsecret government information. The second part of this project includes conducting
a pilot test with several college level students with basic understanding of the topic.
They are presented with the taxonomy and the three scenarios and are asked to
classify the attacks. This will help to understand whether the taxonomy is easy to
use and understand and whether it provides exhaustive information on each of the
dimensions.
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RESULTS
Scenarios
While we are yet to see a true large warfare effort on a global scale, there have been
numerous instances when critical infrastructure and industrial control systems
(ICS) have been attacked. Figure 3 shows the history of these attacks over the last
two decades and identifies some of the main actors on the global arena that have
the potential to cause devastating damages. Some of these countries are USA,
Russia, China, North Korea, Israel, and Ukraine. Even though it is very difficult to
prove with certainty that an attack was funded by a particular state, there is some
information about state-funded cyberarmies such as the ones in China (Hvistendahl,
2010) and North Korea (Haggard & Lindsay, 2015).

Figure 3. History of Cyberattacks Globally in ICS – adopted from Azarcon (2017)
For the purposes of this study, we used three scenarios to illustrate possible types
of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. Those were informed based on
publicly available data on Stuxnet virus, the Ukrainian power grid shutdown, and
the numerous ransomware attacks against government facilities in the US. First, we
present the scenario, then we test to see whether our taxonomy can effectively
explain it, and then we examine possible controls to increase the guardianship
aspect of the RAT used to inform the taxonomy development.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2021/iss2/3

12

Plachkinova and Vo: A Taxonomy of Cyberattacks against Critical Infrastructure

Stuxnet
When it comes to cyberterrorist attacks, a real massive cyberwar on a global scale
is yet to happen. However, this does not mean that it will not happen one day.
Stuxnet opened the door to this type of crime. The purpose of the Stuxnet worm
was to sabotage Iran’s uranium enrichment program, not spread terror. But the
cyberweapon’s demonstration effect was enormous, showing the world how
cyberterrorism could potentially cause substantial physical damage to critical
infrastructures by attacking the computer controllers and SCADA systems that
regulate industrial machinery.
The Stuxnet code has spread to computer programmers and hackers around the
world. However, its sole victim was the electrical motors and industrial controllers
used at Natanz and it did not cause any known damages to other devices (Farwell
& Rohozinski, 2011). Almost a decade later, it is still unclear whether non-state
hackers have the capacity and the willingness to modify and learn from the code in
Stuxnet and other cyber-weapons developed by states to attack other SCADA
systems in similar ways. Such uncertainty is troublesome and as Kenney (2015)
suggests, “policymakers and computer security professionals should devote greater
resources to understanding the potential for non-state actors to exploit cyberweapons developed by states and how to stymie the spread of this malicious code”
(p. 127).
Based on this information, we can classify Stuxnet as follows:
•
•
•

CPS components: cyber-physical
Hacker motivation: political and economic
Security: Threats (external, man-made), vulnerabilities (technical), and
controls (vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, log monitoring, and
auditing).

What this shows is that Stuxnet is a complex type of cyberattack against critical
infrastructure and it can target more than one of the proposed dimensions in the
taxonomy. We were expecting this because most SCADA cyberattacks are quite
sophisticated and attackers rarely have a single reason to breach such systems.
The value of the taxonomy comes from the fact that based on the attacker
motivation per RAT, we can tailor our controls and provide more efficient means
of guardianship of our critical assets such as developing plans for identifying and
responding to incidents related to national security infrastructure. Being able to
detect cyberattacks and respond to them in a comprehensive and timely fashion is
crucial for any entity.
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Ukrainian Power Grid Shut Down
In December 2015, the Ukrainian Kyivoblenergo, a regional electricity distribution
company, reported service outages to customers that were due to a third party’s
illegal entry into the company’s computer and SCADA systems. Over 225,000
customers in various areas were affected by the power loss and the Ukrainian
government officials claimed the outages were caused by a cyberattack, and that
the Russian security services were responsible for the incidents (Lee et al., 2016)
In terms of capability, the attackers demonstrated a variety of capabilities,
including spear phishing emails, variants of the BlackEnergy malware, and the
manipulation of Microsoft Office documents that contained the malware to gain a
foothold into the IT networks of the electricity companies (Lee et al., 2016). They
showed the capability to gain a foothold and harvest credentials and information to
gain access to the ICS network.
Additionally, the attackers proved expertise, not only in network connected
infrastructure, such as Uninterruptable Power Supplies (UPSs), but also in
operating the ICSs through supervisory control system, such as the Human Machine
Interface. The SANS report (Lee et al., 2016) presents a level of sophistication of a
cyberattack that only a state-funded entity would possess and it also presents some
recommendations for critical infrastructure facilities when it comes to
cyberterrorism defense.
Based on this information, we can classify the Ukrainian power grid shut down
as follows:
•
•
•

CPS components: physical
Hacker motivation: political
Security: Threats (external, man-made), vulnerabilities (technical), and
controls (vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, log monitoring, and
auditing).

Similar to the Stuxnet virus, the attack against the Ukrainian power grid
demonstrates the motivation of nation-state actors to establish power and
dominance over other countries and showcase their ability to control critical
infrastructure systems. This perfectly exemplifies the need to provide more
rigorous guardianship and controls to prevent other attacks like that in the future.
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Ransomware Attacks
And finally, our third scenario is based on the numerous ransomware attacks that
have been on the rise in the last few years. Some examples include WannaCry and
Ryuk. WannaCry is a ransomware worm that spread rapidly through several
computer networks in May of 2017. After infecting Windows computers, it
encrypts files on the hard drive, making them impossible for users to access, then
demands a ransom payment in bitcoin in order to decrypt them.
A number of factors made the initial spread of WannaCry particularly
significant: it struck a number of important and high-profile systems, including
many in Britain's National Health Service; it exploited a Windows vulnerability
that was suspected to have been first discovered by the NSA; and it was linked to
the Lazarus Group, a cybercrime organization that may be connected to the North
Korean government (Fruhlinger, 2018).
Another type of ransomware attack attributed to the same Lazarus Group in
North Korea is Ryuk. Unlike the common ransomware, systematically distributed
via massive spam campaigns and exploit kits, Ryuk is used exclusively for tailored
attacks. In fact, its encryption scheme is intentionally built for small-scale
operations, such that only crucial assets and resources are infected in each targeted
network with its infection and distribution carried out manually by the attackers.
This, of course, means extensive network mapping, hacking and credential
collection is required and takes place prior to each operation. Its alleged attribution
to Lazarus Group may imply that the attackers are already well experienced in the
targeted attacks domain, as seen by attacks such as the breach of Sony Pictures in
2014 (Cohen & Herzog, 2018).
Some recent victims of such ransomware attacks are the City of Baltimore,
Jackson County, and the Atlanta airport. It is interesting to note that Jackson County
was one of the few who decided to pay the cyberterrorists and as a result, they paid
almost $500,000 in bitcoin to get their data back. These few examples clearly
demonstrate the need to develop more rigorous tools for protecting critical assets.
With respect to our proposed taxonomy, such ransomware attacks against
SCADA systems can be classified as:
•

CPS components: cyber

•

Hacker motivation: economic

•

Security: Threats (external, man-made), vulnerabilities (technical), and
controls (data backup and recovery).
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Going back to the two research questions posed in the beginning of the paper,
through exploring the three scenarios we demonstrated that the proposed taxonomy
can successfully classify knowledge on cyberattacks against critical infrastructure,
because the dimensions it is comprised of are broad enough to capture various
threats, targets, and security controls. And with regards to the second research
question, we established that RAT can, and is in fact, a valuable tool to build our
theoretical foundation. It gives us a solid research background that we can use to
solve real-world problems such as incident detection and response as prescribed by
DSR.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This is among the first studies of its kind and, as such, it comes with certain
limitations. For example, due to the sensitive nature of critical infrastructure
facilities, we are severely limited when it comes to collecting data on cyberattacks.
Thus, we had to rely on publicly available secondary data. However, our future
plans include validating the proposed taxonomy through interviews with
information security professionals. That will help us refine and improve our work,
following DSR best practices. We encourage our colleagues to further explore the
tool we proposed and conduct qualitative interviews with critical infrastructure
experts around the world. The scenarios utilized for this study are useful but getting
feedback from practitioners is a logical next stage of this project.

CONCLUSION
Cybercrime and cyberterrorism are issues of growing concern, yet not much has
been done to address the problem and provide mechanisms for more adequate
incident identification and response. We witness cyberattacks every day and if we
have credit cards or have shopped in some of the most popular chains, we have
already been victims of these attacks. They are especially threatening when it comes
to critical infrastructure and national security. Thus, as a society we need to put
more pressure on policy makers to address these concerns and provide more
effective and adequate regulations to reduce cybercrime and respond to incidents.
If as a nation we demonstrate that we do not tolerate these types of crimes, it will
send a clear sign to hackers and any individuals with malicious intents that there
are severe consequences to their actions. We can start this process by leveraging
the Routine Activity Theory and focusing on strengthening our security posture as
individuals, corporations, and nation.
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The taxonomy we propose in this study is a good first step in addressing this
important issue and providing researchers and practitioners with the tools necessary
to better understand the challenging environment of cyberterrorism and cybercrime.
While there may be many hurdles to proactively addressing the problem such as
lack of adequate policies, regulations, resources to investigate these attacks,
multiple jurisdictions, and complicated extradition policies, it is our duty to provide
better guardianship of critical infrastructure facilities and ensure that we have
implemented all the necessary controls to reduce cybercrime and cyberterrorism
and that if these crimes were to happen, we will be ready to respond to them.
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